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NIETZSCHE AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM: THE QUESTION OF EPISTEMOLOGY

This paper examines the similarities and divergences between Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of language and the Russian Formalist conception of aesthetic activity. By comparing Nietzsche's writings of 1870s and the early works of the Formalists, the author makes the case for a great deal of correspondence in the use of some critical concepts designating the status of language. However, a closer examination of Nietzsche's and the Formalist respective theories reveals that, despite the initial proximity, the epistemological premises of Nietzsche's theory of demetaphorization and the Formalists' utilization of the process of automatization of artistic perception, bear substantial differences.

Key Words: Demetaphorization, Automatization, Epistemology, Language, Truth, Science

„They are deeply immersed in illusions and dream images; their eyes merely glide across the surface of things and see ‘forms’; nowhere does their perception lead into truth; instead, it is content to receive stimuli and, as it were, to play with its fingers on the back of things.“

Nietzsche

It would be an overstatement to argue that the intellectual history of Russian Formalism have remained unwritten over a half-century long Western and Russian scholarship on Formalism. However, as far as the epistemological foundations of the Formalist postulations are concerned, the major Western accounts of the movement have left the issue virtually attended.¹ Therefore, despite the abundance of historical, comparative and theoretical takes on a number of vital concepts, we have a situation that a genealogical, meta-theoretical examination of those concepts, one that would not exhaust itself neither in juxtapositions, nor in diachronic pursuits of origins, is still awaiting to be done. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper will be to elucidate an aspect of European intellectual his-

¹ I am here referring to two classic works that marked the Western reception of Formalism, Victor Erlich's *Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) and Peter Steiner's *Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1984).

tory that might have importantly shaped the intellectual dynamic of Russian Formalism.

Although the Formalists' participation in what we may provisionally call the European intellectual modernity was never a matter of dispute, the more concrete, case-specific aspects of this allegiance have been given only a partial consideration.² In order to come to terms with the epistemological underpinnings of Formalist aesthetics, we will not be elucidating empirical references to any aspect of European intellectual history that existed in Formalist writings. Rather, I will be pursuing an unstated, nevertheless, strikingly plausible line of investigation: I will evoke the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, whose writings exerted powerful, and well-documented, influence on Russian intelligentsia of the Silver Age, but who might have had even more thorough impact on the early formation of Russian Formalism.³ As I will demonstrate, willingly or not, the Formalists as the new paradigm contenders in the studies of language and literature, utilized the wide array of *bona fide* Nietzschean concepts to challenge the intellectual legacy of the past and corroborate new concepts and ideas.

Arguably the most radical, and certainly most Nietzschean in this regard, was the founding member of the Petrograd-based Society for the Study of Poetic Language (ОПОИаЗ), Viktor Borisovich Shklovskii. In the pioneering essays of 1914 and 1917, 'The Resurrection of the Word', and 'Art as Device',⁴ not only the use of specific philosophical metaphors, but the idiosyncratic, post-lapsarian meditation on the loss of perceptive function of discourse, strikingly echo Nietzsche's critique of the semantic capacity of language and its *par excellence* metaphoric nature. In order to substantiate this connection, I will first expound on Nietzsche's short, yet seminal work of 1873 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense' in

2 As I will demonstrate later, some exceptions do apply here with regard to the Formalist assimilations of Henri Bergson's philosophy.

3 Let me stress again that this is not to say that Nietzsche's impact on Russian intellectual situation has not been given consideration at all. On the contrary, it has become customary for every account of the intellectual background of the Russian Silver Age, and the authors such as Viacheslav Ivanov, Dmitrii Merezhkovskii or Vasilii Rozanov, to address the influence that certain works and concepts of Nietzsche—such as the Apollonian/Dionysian principle, or the notion of *der Übermensch*—exerted on them. Especially instructive in this regard is the collection of essays edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal. See Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (ed.), *Nietzsche in Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Alas, the collection contains no attempts to tackle Nietzsche's assimilation in the Formalist circles.

4 Viktor Shklovsky, 'Resurrection of the Word', in *Russian Formalism*, ed. Stephen Bann and John E. Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1973), 41–48, and Viktor Shklovsky, 'Art as Device', in *Theory of Prose*, transl. by Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), 1–14. The latter text was first published in the influential collection *Poetika: Sborniki po teorii poeticheskogo iazyka*, Vol. II (Prag: 1917), 3–14. The Russian original of this text is also available online at <<http://www.opojaz.ru/manifests/kakpriem.html>>.

which the German philosopher first elaborates his challenge to the epistemological validity of scientific language.⁵ Then I will probe Nietzsche's principles against argumentation we find in Shklovskii's early work.

Despite its unassuming, fragmentary, rather than discursive form, Nietzsche's essay undertakes an ambitious philosophical task: it calls into question the capacity of philosophical language to nominate and define things and states of affairs. Or, in Nietzsche's radical vein, the task of his critique is to deny the legitimacy of philosophy to deal with the truth. Indeed, the discourse of science is judged as insufficient to bear the scientific or any other truth. But, according to Nietzsche, instead of changing the nature of our approach to human knowledge, this incapacity only prompted the philosophers to further their lamentable and fruitless quest. In spite of the inaptness of human mind and language to grasp the truth, the *truth drive*—an instinct that is, according to Nietzsche, not cognitive but moral to the core—comes to the fore and demands meanings and truths be formulated. In a nutshell, that is how the edifice of modern science is built: in order to achieve what is called scientific truth, the science 'petrifies' and imprisons the originally Protean nature of language by seizing one of its manifold moments and subsuming it under the unitary meaning of a concept.

It would be inadequate to detach Nietzsche's radical critique of language, its ontological status or its referential power from his wider intention to challenge the spirit of positivism that characterized the intellectual climate of his time. It is only against this background that Nietzsche's universal critique of the nature of human knowledge and, consequently, language came about. According to Nietzsche, the philosophy must ask itself some fundamental questions: for example, how to articulate what the science—knowledge, truth—are? Since the world as the object of knowledge is unstable, the positivist conception of knowledge will be inherently impaired to grasp it. Yet again, despite this dual insufficiency of mind and language, the scientific spirit attempts to seize the objective world. Language, of course, deceptively lands itself for such an adventure and seemingly proves capable to express the 'scientific image' of the world. However, Nietzsche insists that this utilized language of science

5 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. Gaymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 139-153. Regrettably, there is no textual evidence to corroborate the link between Shklovskii's and Nietzsche's critique of signification. Moreover, I found no references to this particular article by Nietzsche in the (otherwise prolific) Russian reception of the philosopher, until its first post-Soviet publication in *The Book on Philosopher*. However, by the time he set to write his early articles on language and poetics, Shklovskii could have read both the first German edition of Nietzsche's work and the first English translation of Nietzsche's *Collected Works*.

will be an inert, empty language devoid of its natural, genuinely *metaphoric* tenets.

It is for this reason that the positivistic science has to neglect the inherent polyvalence of discourse and restrict the metaphoric potential of language: in order to put forward the representational, veristic capacity of language and create the artificial language of truth, the very attributes of language had to be suppressed. It is of great importance for our understanding of the poetics of Russian Formalism to grasp Nietzsche's subsequent argument that the central mechanism of this 'pseudo-scientific' language of truth is the *demetaphorization* of language, the process that in practice entails the detachment of the tropological/figurative qualities of original language by replacing them with the so-called 'corresponding' notion of language.⁶

It was along these lines that Nietzsche raised the question about the nature of discourse: 'what is a word' he asks and gives a radical, virtually Saussurean, answer: nothing but '[t]he copy of a nervous stimulation in sounds'. Moreover, he elaborates, '[...] to infer from the fact of nervous stimulation' that there exist a certain cause that resides 'outside us', would be an incongruous application of the principle of 'sufficient reason'.⁷ The variety of human languages, a phenomenon that inspired philosophers and incited debates from ancient times, was deemed by Nietzsche as yet another symptom of the fundamental 'truthlessness' of language: there is no such thing as essence or meaningful core of/in language, he insists. Governed by this initial negation, Nietzsche articulates his crucial take against the anti-idealist philosophy of language, epitomized by the then vastly influential work of Wilhelm von Humboldt. According to Humboldt, the most important feature of human languages was precisely to be found in the unity of ideal sense of language (*der innere Sprachsinn*) and its material appearance in sound, the process he called the 'high synthesis'.⁸

Unlike Humboldt, one of Nietzsche's core beliefs was that human language contained virtually no inherently logical, sense-bearing mechanisms. In accordance with his poetic, rather than noetic, conception of

6 With regard to that, Nietzsche can rightly be assumed to be an early opponent of what would later become known as the 'correspondence theory of truth'. In simple terms, this fundamental principle of analytic philosophy has it that *truth* is what corresponds to factuality (i.e. factual reality), as well as that language possesses the capacity to depict that reality.

7 Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', 144.

8 A more substantial consideration of the relationship between Nietzsche's critique of language and the nineteenth century conceptions of language, especially with the master-narrative of Classical German Idealism, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, can be found in Christian J. Emden's *Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

language, Nietzsche maintained that the ill-conceived pursuit of truth in language was in fundamental conflict with other, even more 'legitimate' potentials of language. According to Nietzsche, the very emergence of logical concepts, i.e. complex words of secondary meanings, is nothing but the abolition of one of those primary potentials of language, its capacity to create metaphors. The aberration that is perpetuated in order to formulate a logical concept and ascertain 'truth' in language has its origins in a certain *will* to communicate what cannot be communicated, to equate of what is fundamentally different. Although it is only the uniqueness of individual experience that gives birth to the original, initial concept, this singularity is then replicated and elevated to a universal level. Therefore, Nietzsche concludes that truth, or, the truth depicted in language, is but a

'mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations, which have been subjected to poetic and rhetoric intensification, translation and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people like firmly established, canonical and binding: truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, *metaphors* which have become *worn* by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour [...].'⁹

The urge for such truth, Nietzsche maintains, originates from an unknown source. However, laments the philosopher, despite its principally unknown origins, the truth has always figured as an obligation imposed on humans by social order. This restrictive and impoverishing procedure of the fixation of customary metaphors found its expression in a number of fixed conventions. What stands in contrast to that reductive impulse for truth is, again, the *metaphoric* power of words, a power that still preserves the *memory* of various stimuli, feelings, *moments of being*. In an attempt to oppose the strong tradition stemming from Plato to Descartes and beyond, within which knowledge was seen as a synchronized form of memory, Nietzsche argues that truth and knowledge (or, more accurately, the false truth and the inadequate knowledge) actually begin with *oblivion*, with *forgetfulness* about their past. It was in relation to this moment that Nietzsche's has famously concluded that the truth of concepts is built on the 'residue of a metaphor' and the formation of meaning will resemble a game of dice.¹⁰

As we have noted, Nietzsche's critique of the socio-cultural construction of knowledge ultimately address the way in which the philosophy of his time treated the relationship between the world and the perceptive,

9 Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', 146.

10 Nietzsche, 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', 147.

cognitive and linguistic faculties of the subject. Not only must the validity of this tripartite scheme of human knowledge be challenged by way of contesting the validity of ‘the truth drive’—as it is the moral instinct that acts as an initiator of impossible unities, that of consciousness and the world, language and mind, etc.—but also the primary relationship between ‘original perceptions’ and the ‘thing in itself’ (the Platonic and Kantian respective terms for what the neo-Aristotelian or analytic tradition preferred to call ‘state of affairs’) is deemed as highly problematic precisely from the ontological point of view. Nietzsche argues,

‘[...] the “correct perception”—which would mean the full and adequate expression of an object in the subject—is something contradictory and impossible; for between two absolutely different spheres [...] there is no causality [...] but at best an aesthetic way of relating [...].’¹¹

Nietzsche’s questioning of the correspondence, or rather commensurability, between the philosophical subject and world of objects, opens a new critical front on which the German philosopher battles the fundamental principles of German idealism. Not only does Nietzsche repudiate the existence of the ideal essences of the world, but he gives an outright repudiation of the phenomenal world, and the whole idea that the being is bifurcated into phenomenon and *noumenon*.¹² Whoever the real addressee of this critical statement was, Nietzsche uses it to subject to criticism not only the reigning idealism, but empiricism as its reverse side, by arguing that truth can be contained in an image or thought rather than in reality. It will be present, for example, in a song sung by a painter without hands, while he, unable to paint, imagines himself a picture.¹³ No doubt, the Kantian paradigm of knowledge—which, in Nietzsche’s view, dominated the science and philosophy of his time and, according to which, the principles and categories of our knowledge are to be *a priori* imposed upon objects of our perception—is here rejected in favour of what Nietzsche calls substitution of one—axiologically equivalent, but not structurally correspondent—sphere for another. Unlike this, the structure of scientific mind—the master-example of which is, yet again, the transcendental idealism in the vein of Kant’s *Third Critique*—is doing nothing but copying the mechanism of ‘metaphor formation.’ In imposing its own principles and tools the scientific knowledge of our time

11 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’, 148.

12 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’, 149.

13 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense’, 148-9.

confines its own horizons, or in Nietzsche's words, falls short of what is 'marvellous about the laws of nature'.¹⁴

This critique of the intellectual legacy of German idealism and, especially, the rethinking of the origins and possibilities of scientific knowledge, bears major relevance for a better understanding of the vital concepts of Formalist aesthetics, namely that of *estrangement*, or *defamiliarization* (Russ. *ostranenie*). In order to substantiate this view, I will briefly revisit the aesthetic function of this mechanism and also draw on rather conspicuous use of rhetoric on the part of the Formalists, most notably their most visible exponent, Viktor Shklovskii. The origins of the concept and the selective terminology, in my view, speak of a considerable, yet insufficiently addressed, Formalist engagement with Nietzsche's ideas on mind and language.

The early Formalist approach to literature was marked by an imperative request for methodological rigour, for what the contemporary sociology of science would call a disciplinary distinction of literature and, thus, literary scholarship. As pronounced by Roman Jakobson, by disentangling literature from other discursive *series*, and by building up a new, appropriate critical apparatus, these specifically literary features, the very *literariness* of literature, will finally come to the fore.¹⁵ The methodology of the new-born discipline, Shklovskii argued, should break up with the legacy of Symbolism, which conflated words and images, and create the critical vocabulary of its own. The aspects of literature and poetry that the literary scholarship proper is supposed to focus on are the verbal forms used to achieve specific, literary effects in the recipients' perception.

When taken *prima facie*, not all of Shklovskii's classical pronouncements lend themselves for a fruitful comparison with Nietzsche's critique of scientific discourse. In the first place, Shklovskii seems to advocate the rejection of the symbolic, i.e. vague and inaccurate critical apparatus in favour of a more exact discourse of literary scholarship. But it is at least equally important not to overlook that, in addition to the important call for methodological rigour in the studies of literature, Shklovskii makes use of the similar instance of the critique of the cognitive, representational capacities of language. Moreover, from the early outset, he

¹⁴ In his *Critique of Judgment* Kant critiques the metaphoric language of philosophers. The representation can be either symbolic or schematic, and it is only the latter that should be the concern of philosophical discourse. For an excellent discussion of Kant's treatment of metaphoric language see Paul de Man, 'The Epistemology of Metaphor', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1978), 13-30.

¹⁵ Roman Jakobson, 'Новейшая русская поэзия', in *Selected Writings*, Vol. 5 (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 305.

conceives of language primarily in creative, *symbolic* terms: in the 1915 'Resurrection of the Word' the metaphoric potential of language is assumed the primary act of human creation. Somewhat later, in 'Art and Device', other functions/uses of language (e.g. cognitive or pragmatic) are deemed derivative and thus deviating from the original metaphoric source of language. Despite the fact that this dynamics of deviation from the true, *poetic* nature of language is permanently in operation, the primordial, metaphoric power of discourse remains as it were *buried* in its *form*. In the spirit and rhetoric that strikingly resemble those of Nietzsche, Shklovskii contends that the loss of the primordial metaphoric potential of language brings about '[...] dead words and language that looks like a *cemetery*'. What is more, it will be this impoverishment of language (i.e. its *demetaphorization*) that will, according to Shklovskii, set the ground for the emergence of scientific discourse.¹⁶

Devoid of its metaphoric potential, argues the Russian critic further, the pragmatic discourse is 'algebraising' the object of speech. It could also be said that Shklovskii here identifies and critiques the emergence of the Kantian notion of objective ('schematic') representation as the supreme capacity of discourse in its relation to external reality. What impinges on this mechanism of demetaphorization in aesthetic relation is the speaker's intention to express himself in an exact and economic way, with the minimum amount of language signs. As a result, the listener receives the message with the minimum of redundancy, but this predictability of linguistic signs will prove deceptive: what the loss of the primary, metaphoric potential of language leads to is the *automatization* of perception of the speaker and the listener alike. In other words, once we stop paying attention to the medium of message, i.e. to the language itself, our verbal perception becomes automatized. Accordingly, in order to *deautomatize* our perception and thus regain the original potential of language, a certain *estrangement* from the petrified, objectivised forms of representation is needed. Needless to say, the artistic language of poetry here emerges as the ideal example of discourse in which the metaphoric potential of discourse can be regained.

As far as the intellectual origins of the device of estrangement are concerned, there seems to be a fair deal of coverage in literature on Formalism. The debt of the Formalists to the Danish aesthetician Brøder Christiansen and his, in Russia, vastly influential book *Philosophie der Kunst* (1909), was first mentioned by Victor Erlich in his now classic 1955 study *Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine* and further elucidat-

¹⁶ Viktor Shklovsky, 'Art as Device', in *Theory of Prose*, trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), z6-12 [emphasis added].

ed by Aage Hansen-Löve in his excellent and comprehensive *Der russische Formalismus: methodologische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung* (1978).¹⁷ Namely, Christiansen inaugurated the mutually related notions of ‘differential impressions’ (*Differenzimpression*) and ‘differential qualities’ (*Differenzqualitäten*) as the properties of aesthetic form, which are capable of encompassing differences that coexist in our habitual perception. This feeling of difference, Christiansen then comes to argue, is generated/incited by the perception of something that is ‘inaccessible to the [habitual] perception’ and it was precisely this feeling of difference that was capable of putting together the vast ‘realm of inexhaustible multitude’.¹⁸

Another important impetus for the Formalist conception of estrangement came from the French philosopher Henri Bergson. In his essay on *Laughter*, Bergson argued that artistic consciousness, unlike ordinary perception, ‘brushes aside [...] all that masks reality from us’, which necessitates a certain break with ‘*utilitarian conventions*’.¹⁹ It was this argument by Bergson that inspired Lev Iakubinskii’s work on identical liquids, the paper which, along with Shklovskii’s ‘Art as Device’, inaugurated the theory of estrangement.²⁰ The work by Iakubinskii represents if not the most elaborate then certainly most Bergsonian attempt of Russian Formalism to corroborate the fundamental distinction between practical language and poetic language. Iakubinskii delves into several examples taken from European and Japanese poetic tradition in which poetic discourse has always been identified in stark contrast to practical discourse. The distinctive quality that separates between two types of

17 Christiansen’s book was first published in Germany in 1909, and appeared in Russian translation as early as in 1911. See Broder Khristiansen, *Философия искусства* (St Petersburg: Shipovnik, 1911); Brøder Christiansen, *Philosophie der Kunst* (Hanau: Clauss & Feddersen, 1909). The impact of the book in Russia of the 1910s and 1920s was indeed enormous and its traces are visible in virtually every Russian school of thought of the time: from the Silver Age thinkers, such as Nikolai Berdiaev and Viacheslav Ivanov, to the phenomenological aesthetics of Gustav Shpet and the early philosophical interests of the Bakhtin Circle. On Christiansen’s role in this context see Hanzen-Löve, Oge A. [O. A. Hansen-Löve], *Русский формализм: методологическая реконструкция развития на основе принципа ограничения* (Moscow: Иазики русской кул’туры, 2001) and, also, Victor Erlich classic *Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

18 Khristiansen, 103–108.

19 Quotes from Bergson’s *Laughter* taken from online text available at <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/laemc10.txt>. (Accessed on 19 November 2006; emphasis added). See also James M. Curtis, ‘Bergson and Russian Formalism’, *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1976), 109–121 (111).

20 The only direct reference on Bergson in the early phase of Russian Formalism may be found in Iakubinskii’s 1919 ‘Скопление одинаковых плавнукх’ (‘The Accumulation of Identical Liquids in Practical and Poetic Language’), in *Поетика: Сборники по теории поэтического языка* (Prague: 1919), 13–21. Later reprinted in Л. П. Иакубинский, *Иазики и еџо функционирование* (Moscow: Наука, 1986), 176–182.

discourses is the 'high accumulation of liquids', which is considered typical only of poetic discourse. Finally, argued the Russian linguist, it is the emergence of this phenomenon of verbal speech that brings about the *deautomatization* of the recipient's perception.

This brief genealogy of the Formalist concept of estrangement shows how the Russian linguists and literary scholars utilized one and the same insight into the ambiguous status of language. What causes this permanent instability was the conflict between the inherently present metaphoric potential of language and its pragmatic capacity, but this major Formalist pronouncement did not lead them to reflect further upon the nature of this process and its philosophical, social or other ramifications. Rather, the Formalists maintained the distinction between poetic and pragmatic uses (or, 'functions', as they called it) of language as one of the cornerstones of aesthetic activity, so their further elaboration of the process of *demetaphorization* or *automatization* of language remained somewhat localized and utilized in a purely aesthetic context.

What is more, the partial use of powerful critical tools within the confines of one disciplinary practice brought the early Formalist theory on a brink of a methodological and, especially, epistemological incoherence, e.g. the coexistence of the metaphoric critique of language and the demand for scientific exactness. It is this ambivalence or incompleteness of the Formalist epistemology that draws the major line between their poetics of estrangement and Nietzsche's critique of language. Despite the substantial proximity of some key terms and concepts, the gulf between Nietzsche's and the Formalist epistemologies actually remains substantial. For Nietzsche, who, in his critique of language and scientific knowledge, developed a profound critique of causalism and scientific positivism, the 'instinct of causality' in scientific thinking was nothing but the way of our coping with the 'fear of the unfamiliar'.²¹ Nietzsche's understanding of language, as well as his views of perception and knowledge, are inseparable from the fundamental principles of his philosophy: there cannot be 'familiarity', or positive exactness, for that matter, in the ever-occurring world, as there is no absolute correspondence between the world and human mind.

Hence, the much debated Nietzschean conception of language is emerging now as a consequence, or rather, anticipation, of his subsequent philosophy: the relationship between human language (a derivative, scientific language in particular) and the world is purely arbitrary. Thus every attempt to mitigate this fundamental incongruence has 'pi-

21 Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, quoted from Tracy B. Strong, 'Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche's critique of Epistemology', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1976), 254.

ous' and moral, rather than philosophical intentions. And this is the most penetrating aspect of Nietzsche's critique of language: every act of nomination essentially acts as a primary metaphorization, which will soon turn into an attempt not only to put under the rule of mind the uniqueness of the world, but, quite in Kantian terms, to re-create the world according to 'the image of he who names.'²²

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Душан Радуновић

НИЧЕ И РУСКИ ФОРМАЛИЗАМ: ПИТАЊЕ ЕПИСТЕМОЛОГИЈЕ

Резиме

Овај рад проучава подударности и разлике између Ничеове критике филозофског језика и концепције естетског процеса руских формалиста. Поређећи ране Ничеове радове о језику и најраније списе формалиста аутор показује да између њих влада велика сличност на терминолошком плану. Међутим, подробнија анализа положаја који критика процеса губљења метафоричког потенцијала језика има код немачког филозофа и код руских аутора, недвосмислено је наметнула закључак да иницијална претпоставка о њиховој терминолошкој сличности заправо скрива дубље концептуалне разлике.

²² Strong, 'Language and Nihilism', 256.