Vladimir M. Žegarac[1]
University of Bedfordshire

U-PRAGMATICS AND E-PRAGMATICS: MAKING A CASE FOR I-PRAGMATICS[2]

This article presents an argument which shows that there is a natural point of contact between the social-descriptive and the cognitive-psychological relevance-theoretic approaches to communication. The argument is based on an analogy between the concepts of Universal Grammar, E-Language and I-Language, developed within generative linguistics, and the relevance-theoretic model of the cognitive mechanisms and psychological processes of human communication and cognition. I make a case for identifying and investigating culture-specific pragmatic competence in cognitive, relevance-theoretic terms and I try to show how this proposal provides a principled basis for a cognitive psychological concept of pragmatic competence which could be termed I-Pragmatics and which is the natural point of contact between the universal mechanisms of communication and other cognitive domains, including the social ability module.

Keywords: social, cognitive, pragmatics, relevance, Universal Grammar, E-Language, I-Language, competence

1. INTRODUCTION

Descriptive and explanatory accounts in the field of pragmatics (defined here informally as the theory of human communication) need to take account of both its social-cultural and its individual-psychological aspects. The social-cultural aspects of communication cannot be reduced to (i.e. fully explained in terms of) individual psychology, but nor can they be explained without taking account of the cognitive mechanisms and psychological processes of human communicative behaviour. So, the prima facie case for investigating communication from both the social-cultural and the cognitive-psychological perspectives is not open to serious challenge. In other words, the social-cultural and the cognitive-psychological approaches to communication should not proceed along parallel tracks, as they have traditionally done, although they have different goals. This point has not always been given due emphasis in the pragmatics literature. Thus, Blakemore (1992: 47) observes:

[...] there is no conflict between Leech's socio-pragmatic approach and the present psychological approach because they are attempting to do different things. For this reason it is misleading to include phenomena like politeness, face-saving and turn-taking together with the phenomena discussed in the following chapters under the general heading of pragmatics. The issue is not just about what we should call pragmatics, but that this conflation obscures that these two approaches are doing different things, [...]

Does this mean that in Blakemore's (1992) view attempts to bring the social and the cognitive-psychological perspectives together are misguided? I believe that it does not. Blakemore's observation could be taken to express the perfectly plausible assumption that bringing the social-cultural and the cognitive-psychological relevance-theoretic approaches to meet on each other's turfs, as it were, would be fundamentally flawed, because the two approaches have different goals. Relevance theory investigates the cognitive-psychological mechanisms of communication aiming to provide answers to the following questions: *What is human communication?*, *How is it achieved?* and *How does it fail?*. However, this does not mean that there is no meeting point between social-cultural and cognitive-psychological perspectives on communication. What it does mean is that the goals of the two approaches should be clearly distinguished, which leaves open the possibility that social-cultural and cognitive-psychological perspectives can be brought together in a fruitful way, provided that their natural common ground is properly identified and plotted out. I argue that pragmatic competence reflects both the universal and the culture-specific aspects of communication, and is the natural meeting point of the cognitive-psychological and the social-cultural approaches to the study of communication.

The article is structured as follows: some of the main tenets of relevance theory (RT) are explained and illustrated in section 2. Section 3 introduces the concepts of Universal Grammar (UG) and presents a tentative analogy between UG and the relevance-theoretic characterisation of the cognitive mechanisms of communication. Some natural points of contact between social and cognitive approaches to communication are described in section 4, where the possibility of characterising the pragmatic competence of an individual, in terms of both the universal cognitive mechanisms of communication and its culture specific aspects, is also presented. The suggestion is put forward that the pragmatic competence internal to the mind of an individual is in some interesting respects analogous to the concept of I-Language, and an attempt is made to show that cultural variation in the pragmatic competence of individuals may plausibly be described in terms of the culture-specific comprehension strategies that they use, rather than being restricted to differences in the contexts available to them.

2. RELEVANCE THEORY

The central problem for a plausible theory of human communication is this: How are people able to communicate far more information than is

specified by (i.e. linguistically encoded in) the words (or other signals) used by the communicator. Utterances and texts that the communicator produces never fully represent her/his thoughts. Rather, the linguistic meanings of the words used are better conceived of as fragments from which the communicator's thoughts can be reconstructed, more or less faithfully, in the mind of the hearer. The following excerpt from an informal exchange illustrates this point:

(1) <u>Situation:</u> Vlad is chatting with Hasnaa, a friend of his, on the mobile phone using the WhatsApp application. Hasnaa is a frequent traveller. Some days before the chat from which the excerpt below is taken she told Vlad that she was in the USA, but she did not let him know how long she would be staying there. At the beginning of the chat Vlad is not sure whether Hasnaa is still in the USA, because (possibly unknown to her) he is aware that she is planning to return to her home country before a particular date (which is less than a week away).

●●●○○ O2-UK 3G   09:11   ⚹ ▮

❮ Chats   962........   📞

Call me 23:23

Now? Ok 23:23 ✓✓

Ok 23:23

On this number? 23:24 ✓✓

Vlad 23:25

Yes 23:25 ✓✓

Hilton Chicago/O...
9333 South Cicero ❯
Avenue, Oak Lawn, I...
23:26

Am in chicago 23:26

Saturday

At the point in the chat captured in the snapshot above, Hasnaa somewhat unexpectedly asks Vlad to call her. He infers that she would like him to make a voice call, but is less than fully confident as to how soon he has been asked to make the call, although - in the absence of any explicit pointers to

the time of the call - he assumes that she is asking him to ring her up more or less immediately. By following his question "Shall I call you now?" with "Ok" without waiting for her reply, he indicates to Hasnaa that the purpose of his question is merely to check his existing understanding of her request, rather than to ask her for more detailed information about the call time, or the reasons for her request to call him. Therefore, Hasnaa is justified in assuming that a minimal answer ('Ok') would be adequately informative. As Vlad is aware that the number they had recently used on another smartphone application (FreePP) was a US number, he concludes that that is the number he should dial on this occasion. However, not being sure that Hasnaa is still in the USA, he decides to ask whether he should call her on the number for her home country. On the other hand, Hasnaa is probably not aware that Vlad knows she needs to be back in her home country very soon, and thinks that Vlad is aware of her whereabouts. For this reason, she does not offer an answer immediately but replies using the vocative: "Vlad". In its standard use, the vocative "picks a person out of a contextually given set of possible addressees, and establishes this person as the addressee of the sentence" (Shaden 2010: 181). As Vlad is already manifestly established as the addressee, he concludes that by using the vocative Hasnaa intends to draw his attention to some information that she presumes is highly salient to him. She interprets his response, "Yes", as an invitation to provide some clarification (perhaps also to answer his question) and gives an indirect answer, "Am in Chicago". This answer is more informative than a direct one would be (e.g. "use my FreePP US number") in that it communicates some assumptions about why Vlad should not make the call using her home country phone number, with an additional overtone of mild surprise at Vlad's suggestion that he might call her on that number. Vlad concludes that Hasnaa does not realize he is aware that she needs to be back in her home country before a date in the near future. However, he decides to "let pass" what he takes to be a case of minor, inconsequential, miscommunication, which he assumes has been caused by the different assumptions he and Hasnaa had made about their presumed shared beliefs (technically, their mutual cognitive environment).

These superficial comments on an ordinary informal communicative exchange between two friends clearly illustrate the importance of context, the complexity of the inferential processes involved in linguistic communication, the fallibility of comprehension and the comparative ease with which minor communication failures can be repaired. In everyday casual conversation comprehension seems to be guided by an imperfect, but good enough, heuristic. It is more oriented towards *good enough* than to a perfect grasp of the communicator's message. In RT terms, the comprehension of a communicative act is a non-demonstrative (i.e. non-deductive) inferential process which takes the evidence of the communicator's intentions in producing the act and contextual assumptions as inputs, and yields interpretations as outputs.

What procedure (strategy or heuristic) does the addressee follows in interpreting the communicative act? Sperber and Wilson (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 16, Sperber 2000, Wilson 2000) have argued that human

communication exploits a tendency of human cognition to be oriented towards the maximisation of informativeness and the minimisation of mental processing effort. Technically, cognition is oriented towards relevance (where relevance is informally defined as a positive function of informativeness and a negative function of processing effort). The search for adequate relevance constrains the inferential comprehension process in a way which explains how the mental representation and processing of communicative acts lead to the selection of contextual assumptions and to predictable outputs of the processing of those acts in the selected context. In other words, a communicative act makes evident the speaker's intention to inform the hearer of some set of assumptions. By producing the communicative act the speaker claims the hearer's attention, thus putting the hearer to the expenditure of some processing effort, giving rise to the expectation that the effort will be offset by adequate cognitive gains (informally, worthwhile information). This generalisation is known as the Communicative Principle of Relevance.

Communicative Principle of Relevance

Every utterance (or other type of ostensive stimulus) conveys a presumption of its own relevance (adapted from Sperber and Wilson 2002: 23).

Presumption of Relevance

The utterance (or other ostensive stimulus) is presumed to be the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences/goals, and at least relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention (adapted from Sperber and Wilson 2002: 23).

The Presumption of Relevance is the basis for a procedure (i.e. strategy or heuristic) that the addressee follows in interpreting a communicative act:

Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure

(a)   Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. In particular, test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

(b)   Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

(Sperber and Wilson 2002: 24)

Consider the last text message from the exchange in (1): 'Am in Chicago'. It expresses the thought that the communicator is in Chicago at the time of communication. But if this were all that she intended to inform the addressee of, her communicative act would not be consistent with the principle of relevance because it would not lead to enough cognitive effects (informally, worthwhile information), as it is evident to both participants that some information about which number to call is relevant to the addressee. The addressee considers what the communicator aiming at optimal relevance intended to communicate

and this leads him to access some contextual assumptions about the relation between phone numbers and geographical locations and to conclude that the communicator's goal was to inform him that he should dial her USA phone number, because she is still in the USA. Moreover, by (somewhat redundantly) reminding him of her location in the way she did (first using the vocative and then the location) she may also have intended to communicate indirectly that she was surprised by, perhaps mildly critical of, his initial failure to figure out which number he should dial. This overtone is perhaps underscored by her decision to include a map of her current location in her reply to his question.

This brief outline of some of the main tenets of RT suggests that cultural variation in pragmatic competence reflects differences in the content, the organization and storage, as well as the salience of the pool of assumptions from which the context for the comprehension of a communicative act is drawn. The Communicative Principle of Relevance is a universal aspect of human communication. As RT is the study of the principles and mechanisms of communication which are universal, it seems reasonable to describe RT as "Universal Pragmatics" (or U-Pragmatics), by analogy with the term "Universal Grammar" (UG).

3. *UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR AND UNIVERSAL PRAGMATICS*

The term Universal Grammar (UG) refers to those properties of the human brain which enable it to learn a language. The argument for the theoretical concept of UG is based on two observations about the human linguistic ability. First, knowledge of language is acquired without explicit tuition on the basis of fragmentary and deficient primary linguistic data. This is famously known as the poverty of stimulus argument for positing the existence of an innate, genetically specified, language faculty. Second, grammars (i.e. methods for assigning meaning and structure to language data) of all human languages share many features and are a tiny subset of logically possible ones. Therefore, language development can be explained only on the assumption that a mechanism for the acquisition of language is hard-wired in the brain. This hypothesised mechanism has been called Universal Grammar (UG) or Language Acquisition Device (LAD). Language acquisition is described as a process of tacit theory building based on primary linguistic data (see Chomsky 1965).

At first sight, it may seem that there is no interesting analogy between UG and the Communicative Principle of Relevance (or the Comprehension Procedure based on it). UG is the capacity for learning a grammar, while the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure is a heuristic: rather than acquire pragmatic competence, people "follow" the procedure (at the sub-personal level) in interpreting communicative acts. This conclusion, however, is not entirely warranted.

3.1. U-Pragmatics as a dedicated mental mechanism

The analogy between UG and the relevance theoretic view of the communicative ability is rather interesting in at least two respects. The concept of UG has undergone some change since it was first introduced. However, these need not be considered here. In the context of the analogy explored in this article, the interesting point is that there are good reasons for positing UG as a mental mechanism dedicated to the analysis of primary linguistic data. If a mental mechanism dedicated to the processing of communicative acts can also be assumed to exist, then the analogy between UG and that comprehension mechanism is of some, though, admittedly, rather limited interest. Sperber and Wilson (2002) argue that utterance interpretation does involve a dedicated mental device, a module, with "its own principles and mechanisms" (where the defining feature of modules is domain specificity, rather than informational encapsulation as Fodor (1983) assumes). They observe that the complexity, the speed and the intuitiveness of comprehension provide evidence for hypothesising the existence of a dedicated mental mechanism. These features of communicative interaction are readily illustrated by the simplest of exchanges, such as the online chat in (1).

3.1.1.   Complexity

The complexity of comprehension is due to the radical underspecification of the message by the linguistic meaning of the communicative act. Each of the lines in (1) admits of indefinitely many interpretations. To give but one example, "Call me" can express the following thoughts, among indefinitely many others (depending on the context):

(a)   The communicator is asking the addressee to shout her name loudly to draw her attention to him.

(b)   The communicator is asking the addressee to ring her up.

(c)   The communicator is giving the addressee permission to call her for help with his computer if he cannot solve the problem himself.

(d)   The communicator is asking the addressee to call her on the phone so she can check whether her phone is working.

(e)   The communicator is ordering the addressee to ring her up so she can issue him orders.

Moreover, each of (a) to (e) is underspecified with regard to the time at which the action of calling is to be performed. For example, if the communicator is asking the addressee to ring her up, is she asking him to do so more or less immediately or at some other relevant time? In the actual exchange, the addressee assumed that he was to ring the communicator immediately, but he decided to check this assumption by asking: "Now?" which he immediately followed with "OK" to indicate that he was merely checking, but was fairly confident that he had understood the request/permission. The point is that

people can communicate a great deal of information by providing snippets of evidence. It is difficult to explain how this might be achieved if comprehension was not constrained by a dedicated mental mechanism.

3.1.2. Speed

Comprehension is very fast. The exchange in (1) took a relatively long time, only due to the rather poor internet connection and because typing on small keyboards may often require frequent self-corrections, which are relatively time consuming. But the telegraphic style of the messages is indicative of emphasis on speed, rather than on accuracy of expression.

3.1.3. Spontaneity

Comprehension is typically spontaneous and relatively effortless. The participants in a communication event typically do not engage in conscious reflective reasoning about each other's intentions. In many situations the addressee has a preference for checking that comprehension has been achieved or for assuming that it is adequate, leaving it to the interlocutor to flag possible misunderstandings or to let them pass, as it were. As we have seen, example (1) is a case in point.

These characteristics of communication lend support to the view that comprehension is made possible by a mental mechanism, a module, dedicated to the processing of utterances and other communicative (technically, ostensive) stimuli (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 14), rather than being guided by some more general social faculty, as has occasionally been suggested. For example, Gillian Brown (1995) dismisses the Communicative Principle of Relevance on the grounds that it is not necessary to explain why and how we pay attention to each other's communicative acts and makes the following claim:

> All that is necessary to motivate a listener paying attention to a particular speaker is to invoke Goffman's social model which will motivate the listener, when appropriate, to preserve the speaker's face by demonstrably paying attention to what the speaker says (Goffman 1967).

> (Brown 1995: 27)

Of course, the Communicative Principle of Relevance does not preclude the vast range of more or less likely reasons for paying attention to communicative acts (or to any other stimuli that impinge on our senses, for that matter). Such reasons may, and often do, include a preference for being kind to others. However, it does not follow from this that the presumption (informally, guarantee) of relevance is not communicated by a communicative act. What does follow is that the hearer may have various reasons for accepting or rejecting the presumption of relevance. Brown gives the example of shoppers in a crowded market "assailed by the noise of traders shouting to advertise their wares" who "are able to 'detune' and ignore the details of the spoken messages, having determined, even without having heard the content, that they are not

relevant to their interests" (Brown 1995: 27). Implicit in this observation is the admission that not paying attention to utterances (and other ostensive stimuli) does take some effort (invested in deliberate "detuning"), so this observation does not provide evidence against the Communicative Principle of Relevance. Brown also raises the issue of why a person might respond to a passer's by question to tell them the time, even though it is evident to both the speaker and to the listener that the information is relevant to the speaker and not to the listener. However, this criticism is not justified either, because the Communicative Principle of Relevance does not say anything about people's preferences for accepting or rejecting the presumption (informally, guarantee) of relevance. Once the presumption of optimal relevance has been communicated and has been accepted, the comprehension process will be guided by the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure.

This takes us to the most important problem with Brown's claim about the importance of Goffman's concept of face for explaining communication. The concept of face does not explain the inferential process which takes the addressee from the linguistically encoded (or other conventionalized) meaning of the communicative act to the message that the communicator intends to communicate by producing the act. For example, it is unclear how the addressee's attendance to the communicator's face might provide the starting point for a reasoned explicit account of the inferential process involved in the interpretation of the string: "Am in Chicago", (1), which involves some implicated premises (such as, "If a person is in a town in one country, it is best to call them on their telephone number in that country rather than on their home country number") and some implicated conclusions (including, "Vlad should dial Hasnaa's USA number").

Sperber and Wilson (see Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 16, Sperber 2000, Wilson, 2000) have argued that human communication exploits a tendency of human cognition to be oriented towards the maximisation of informativeness and the minimisation of mental processing effort (technically, cognition is oriented towards relevance) and that this search for relevance also constrains the inferential comprehension process in a way which explains how the mental representation and processing of communicative acts streamline the inferential comprehension process, leading to predictable outputs of the processing of those communicative acts in context. Without assuming the existence of a specialized dedicated mechanism for attending to ostensive stimuli it is not possible to explain the comprehension of even the simplest communicative acts, such as those in (1), because of the vast gap between their linguistically encoded meanings and the communicated messages.

3.2. U-Pragmatics as a learning mechanism

An interesting difference between UG and the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure is that the former explains how linguistic competence is acquired, whereas the latter is generally not thought of as a mechanism for learning. The terms "Universal Grammar" (UG) and

"Language Acquisition Device" (LAD) are synonymous. In contrast to UG/LAD, the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure is not characterised as a mechanism for acquiring pragmatic competence, but as a universal heuristic for the comprehension of communicative acts which is based on a biologically specified mechanism (a module) dedicated to the processing of ostensive stimuli. If there is an interesting analogy to be made between UG and the Relevance-theoretic cognitive mechanism of communication, there must be some more significant similarity between this mechanism and UG.

The argument for the view that such a similarity does exist is stronger than most work in RT suggests. For example, Escandell-Vidal (2004) observes that the Communicative Principle of Relevance and the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure are universal aspects of communicative competence of individuals, while the norms of communication vary widely across socio-cultural groups. This author points out that, according to Jackendoff (1992), the main task of the social ability is to enable an individual to develop a coherent picture of the self in society. So we have the interaction of two somewhat different devices: the pragmatics module dedicated to the mental processing of representations and the social ability/faculty module dedicated to maintaining a coherent picture of self in society. Escandell-Vidal assumes that this supports the further assumption that explanations offered within socio-cultural pragmatics should be thought of as norms, while explanations in cognitive pragmatics are rooted in principles. Social norms are "tacit generalisations" based on experience of social life. They are "expressions of statistically usual behaviour" and are stored in "the database that makes up the memory store." (Escandell-Vidal 2004: 353). She observes that a general theory of human communication "must accommodate processing devices and representations and give norms and principles their proper place" and concludes:

> Social and grammatical faculties develop as the result of a process by which individuals acquire the pattern(s) of their community. The inferential faculty, on the other hand, is universal in the sense that it is not dependent on cultural habits. Its maturation produces similar results in all humans, regardless of their native language and culture.

> (Escandell-Vidal 2004: 353)

This argument is less convincing than it may seem at first sight. First, universality and cultural variation are not mutually exclusive. The inferential faculty is universal in the way in which all innate faculties (including UG) are universal: it is genetically specified. Whether and to what extent it is subject to cultural elaboration is an empirical matter. The excerpt from the chat between two friends in (1) may be taken to suggest that the participants do not follow the rather abstract Relevance-theoretic Comprehension procedure, but some strategy which is more suitable for the particular type of communicative exchange that they are engaged in. This strategy may include rather strong biases towards minimizing effort, being oriented towards cognitive gains whose relevance is rather low, ignoring misunderstandings which seem minor, possibly also being prepared to assume that some ostensive stimuli (such as the

communicator's location on a map) may have been produced without being intended to convey worthwhile information, but were used simply because it was easy for the communicator to use them. This strategy could be described plausibly as a sub-procedure of the abstract, situation-general, Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure. Secondly, the explanation of the relevant empirical evidence crucially depends on theoretical assumptions about the inferential procedure and the nature of the database from which the context is selected.

Let us consider briefly what kind of strategy or heuristic the Relevance-Theoretic Comprehension Procedure is. It is specialized for processing a particular type of stimuli in the environment – ostensive stimuli. It is in this sense adapted to the environment. Following Gigerenzer *et al* (2002: 161–163), Allott (2002: 79) observes that procedures of this type "incorporate assumptions about the data that they are presented with, so they can rapidly move to correct conclusions, as long as the data really do have those regularities". Now, what kind of regularities is the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure sensitive to? I think there are at least two types of regularities that can be distinguished: those presented by the data (utterances, pointing gestures and other ostensive stimuli) and mental representations about the types of social-cultural situations, such as attending the faculty academic board meeting, a cocktail party, waiting for the bus and so on, which are part of an individual's cognitive environment. So, different social-cultural situations present different regularities. Communicative acts (i.e. ostensive stimuli) come in different types and are specialized in various ways for dealing with different types of peoples' needs (in different types of situations). If, as Allott (2002: 73) argues, "the relevance theoretic model of pragmatics presents a procedure that is rational in the way that it exploits environmental structure to arrive at conclusions efficiently without needing to consider all theoretical possibilities", then we would strongly expect to find sub-procedures, rather than a general computational procedure. We would expect fast and frugal heuristics to be fine-tuned, or calibrated, for dealing with a range of regularities in the environment which fall in a particular broader domain. So, if ostensive stimuli are the domain of the pragmatic faculty, then we would expect to find fast and frugal heuristics which are sensitive to those more specific regularities which distinguish types of ostensive stimuli. We would expect such fast and frugal heuristics to be faster and more frugal than the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure.

There are some good reasons for assuming that such sub-strategies for processing particular types of ostensive stimuli and for streamlining the inferential comprehension process in particular types of situation do exist. For example, there is ample evidence that humans have some innate faculties, such as "naïve physics" (specialised for processing information in the environment about say, cause-consequence relations between weight construed as an inherent property of objects and the tendency of objects to fall with different speeds when dropped from a height). The knowledge of naïve physics (naïve biology and perhaps other faculties) is universal and could be described as the common "Background" (Searle 1996) of all normally functioning mature

humans across cultures. Carston casts Searle's concept of "Background" in cognitive terms:

> We might usefully think of the Background as a set of assumptions and practices that maintain a fairly steady degree of not very high manifestness, across time, in an individual's cognitive environment. A subset of the Background consists in assumptions/practices which make up the mutual cognitive environment of all (non-pathological) human beings – the deep Background; other subsets are the mutual cognitive environments of what can be loosely termed culturally defined groups of human beings – local Backgrounds.

(Carston 2002: 68)

It stands to reason that the assumptions/practices which form the "deep Background" of individuals are incorporated, as it were, in the heuristics for processing regularities in the perceptual environment. For example, our naïve physics knowledge keeps us alert to investing proximal events of particular types with a cause-consequence relation (often going beyond the evidence). Our face recognition mechanism guides us to analyse as faces those configurations of features which bear only a very vague resemblance to human faces. We do not achieve this by using a general but a very specific heuristic. The Communicative Principle of Relevance is just such a domain-specific module of the mind. However, this module could effect the automatic sorting of behaviours into ostensive and non-ostensive, perhaps specifically identifying utterances as ostensive stimuli, but it could also employ a range of sub-heuristics to deal with more fine-grained regularities in the input data. For example, it seems plausible that the orientations of the naïve physics module (e.g. towards cause-consequence and temporal relations between events) is incorporated in the sub-heuristics of the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension procedure. Still, it is far from clear how these orientations could be accounted for in terms of the operation of the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure on a set of contextual assumptions. Now, if by analogy with the deep Background, there are subsets of assumptions/practices which are specific to particular individuals as members of cultural groups (with "local Backgrounds"), then it seems worth considering the possibility that we have developed sub-procedures for processing environmental inputs which incorporate the regularities in these local (or cultural) Backgrounds.

An analogy between the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure and the different procedures built into light meters used in photography with the aim of dealing with regularities in the way they process incoming light patterns is illustrative here. The simplest type of light meter is one which takes the light reading by averaging values from across the whole frame. However, many photographs are taken outdoors and the sky is typically part of the frame. As the sky is generally lighter than the rest of the scene, light meters were designed with a bias, taking into account the light from the lower part of the frame to a greater extent than the light from the top third of the frame in determining the correct exposure (e.g. basing the exposure reading by giving 60% of the overall weighting to the light reflected from the

area covering the lower two thirds of the frame and 40% to the light coming from the top third). But this type of bias is not sufficiently fine-tuned to take account of even some very common situations, such as taking a photograph of a group of people with a great deal more light coming from behind them than is reflected off their faces. In this type setting the light meter will normally give the correct reading for the background, but not for the faces, leading to underexposure. A well-known camera manufacturer addressed this problem by designing a camera whose light metering system had thousands of scene patterns built into its computer memory. Each scene pattern had a particular set of biases in terms of which parts of the frame were to be allocated greater or lower weightings when determining the correct exposure. Once the scene pattern has been selected on the basis of the closest match with the scene, the allocation of values was carried out in accordance with the calibrations of light readings for the situation pattern selected by the computer. The scene patterns with the incorporated biases or weightings can be described as procedures. What is interesting about this analogy is that it would not seem right to treat the thousands of scene patterns as context schemas on which a general light reading procedure is applied. Rather, the preferences are built into the scene patterns stored in the computer memory of the camera. By the same token, it seems reasonable that situation schemas and schemas relating to particular regularities in the use of language (which are the defining features of particular genres) incorporate biases in the orientation towards particular types of contexts, allocations of processing effort and types of cognitive effects.

Further indirect evidence for the likely existence of comprehension sub-strategies is provided by studies of expert systems and problem solving. As Sternberg (1990: 133) observes:

> Intelligent systems rely to a great extent on problem patterns when they face a familiar task. Instead of creating solutions from scratch for every problem situation, they make use of previously stored information in such a way that it facilitates their coping with the current problem.

This is somewhat misleading as it may suggest that "previously stored information" assists problem solving in the same way as contextual assumptions inform comprehension. However, this conclusion should be resisted. Well-known studies of expert chess players show that they rely on abstract knowledge representations when dealing with meaningful configurations of pieces on the chess board, but do not perform better than novices when the configurations are meaningless (Chase and Simon 1973). It seems unlikely that these "sets of abstract knowledge representations" are simply sets of contextual assumptions. They are certainly very different from typical schemas or scripts. For example, a person's schema for the concept of "restaurant" includes propositional mental representations which are activated by the word "restaurant". These representations are contextual assumption, and are relatively easily amenable to consciousness. The contents of abstract knowledge structures that expert chess players use cannot be easily spelled out. In this respect they are rather similar to the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure (and to whatever

comprehension sub-strategies specialised for dealing with particular types of communicative acts or situations).

One of the major problems for the functioning of an intelligent system is inference. As Shank pointed out, an important feature which guides the inferences carried out by an intelligent system is "interestingness":

> Simply stated, the idea behind interestingness is that since people cannot pay attention to all possible inferences, they must attempt to predetermine what inference paths will turn out to be relevant and then pursue those paths that are found to be interesting.

(Shank 1980: 8)

In RT terms, we have expectations of relevance and we pursue those lines of inference which have turned out to be promising, those which are likely to lead to enough contextual effects for no unjustifiable processing effort. This is perfectly consistent with the view that we have a general heuristic with context schemas streamlining the inferential process by informing expectations of relevance. But this is not the only way to make sense of our analogy. We would expect context schemas to be more adaptive if they are abstract knowledge structures which include patterns of situations whose elements have already incorporated (or inscribed) certain biases relating to expected contributions to the overall levels of relevance of the inputs, allocations of effort in the search for particular types of effect, and so on. In other words, it seems perfectly plausible to assume that the procedure activated by a particular regularity in the environment incorporates assumptions about the type of situation that this regularity instantiates and that this knowledge is a part of a comprehension (sub-)procedure incorporated in the abstract knowledge situation schema. For example, we can think about genres as types of communicative acts represented as abstract knowledge structures.

3.2.1. *Genre*

Consider an example which involves some culture-specific knowledge of a culture-particular type of humour as a 'speech genre':

(2)   <u>Situation:</u> (In June 2008, a promising but not yet very well-known Russian tennis player [Alla Kurdyavtseva] was interviewed after winning a match at Wimbledon against a very well-known opponent [Maria Sharapova]. In the press conference after the match Kudryavtseva said that she was very happy to have won and was then asked why she was particularly happy to have beaten Sharapova. In response to this question:

She laughed and said: "Why was I so happy to beat her? *I didn't like her outfit - can I put it that way?"*

"She experiments and I <u>think she is brave to do it</u> <u>but sometimes it doesn't work</u>. I didn't like this one." (quoted from the *Daily Record* 27/06/2008)

By the time she had given the first part of the answer ("I didn't like her outfit") – based on the reactions in the auditorium – Kudryavtseva had already realised that she had made a faux pas. Her remark had been understood as expressing a negative attitude towards her opponent. In fact, it seems more likely that her intention was to convey something negative about the journalist who had asked the question. Right after the question was formulated, Kudryavtseva first hesitated, then repeated the question, then paused, looking mildly puzzled, and finally said: "I didn't like her outfit". As Tatiana Larina, a Russian expert in intercultural communication, has impressed on me, it is quite common in the Russian culture to convey a negative attitude towards a question or remark one finds irrelevant, by giving an evidently irrelevant answer. In the light of the common knowledge that Kudryavtseva was a little known player who had just won a match against the famous opponent, it is quite likely that the interviewee found the question patently irrelevant and tried to express her mild disapproval by giving a manifestly irrelevant (and humorous) answer (as it is a matter of general knowledge that a player's motivation for wanting to win a match is most unlikely to be her disapproval of her opponent's taste in clothes). Appropriate genre knowledge would have oriented the audience towards a different set of contextual effects: implicatures about the interviewee's light-hearted attitude towards her opponent as well as about her mild disapproval of and astonishment at the question. This genre knowledge can be conceptualised as involving a schema about the particular type of language use and could incorporate a sub-heuristic which streamlines comprehension in a particular direction. If such a sub-procedure had been activated, the audience would probably not have misinterpreted what was said in the way they did.

This lends support to a tentative conclusion that the knowledge of particular genres includes not only abstract knowledge structures, and biases towards particular types of effects, but also desirable ratios of effects and effort, rather than sets of contextually derivable assumptions. Some uses of language, such as phatic communication, can also be analysed as involving the use of specialised sub-procedures.

3.2.2. *Phatic communication*

Phatic communication can be described as a type of language use in which the meanings of the words used are almost irrelevant. Phatic utterances fulfil a social function by establishing or maintaining an atmosphere of sociability between people (a sense of being in positive rapport with each other) through overcoming silence, which is inherently unpleasant and somewhat threatening. While the phrase "phatic communion" is closely associated with ritualised aspects of social interaction, the more recent expressions "phatic communication" and "phatic speech" place greater emphasis on the function of conversational exchanges described as phatic. Jakobson (1960) characterizes the "phatic function" of language as its use to focus on the channel of communication itself, rather than on the information conveyed

by the language code. He points out that prolonged phatic conversations sometimes occur precisely when the communication process is threatened (for instance, by the insecurity of the interlocutors). From this perspective, various (more or less conventionalised) ways of opening and ending conversations, as well as maintaining them (e.g. back-channelling devices, such as 'uh-huh') are described as phatic.

The production and comprehension of phatic communicative acts are generally seen as regulated by social conventions about the way particular topics (which might be called "phatic topics") are brought up in particular types of social situation. On the one hand, this makes it difficult to explain communicative acts which have a phatic function, although they are not conventionally phatic, as illustrated by (3):

(3)   Several people (who have never met before) have been waiting at a bus stop in North London for about twenty minutes. One of them walks some distance up the road to see if there is a bus coming. He then rejoins the others and says (facing one of them, who is also waiting impatiently):

"No sign of a bus. I suppose they'll all come together". She replies: "Oh yes. They travel in convoys".

This conversational exchange has the key features of phatic exchanges. The main point of the two utterances does not lie with their propositional contents; rather, the main purpose of the exchange is to establish a sense of solidarity between the interlocutors. But it is not clear how this conversation, and many similar conversations, can be analysed in terms of social conventions or why they might need to be explained in this way. On the other hand, many phatic conversations in which social conventions about topic choice and language use do play a role cannot be fully explained in terms of conventionalisation or standardization (for a discussion of these terms see Bach and Harnish 1982). As Lyons (1968: 417) points out, utterances are not simply phatic or non-phatic, but may be more or less phatic:

We must therefore distinguish between that aspect of the 'use' of utterances which may be referred to their function in 'phatic communion' and that part of their 'use' which is to be distinguished as their meaning (if they have meaning in terms of our definition). In saying this, we recognize that, even when both these aspects are present, either one or the other may be the dominant part of the 'use' of the utterance. There is ample evidence to support this view.

Working within the framework of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), Žegarac and Clark (1999) start from the observation that the "phaticness" of a communicative act largely depends on context. For example, the utterance "It's sunny, but there's a rather cold wind" may be very phatic in one situation (e.g. as part of a chat over coffee between two people who do not expect they will be going out), while not being phatic in a different setting (e.g. if the interlocutors are getting ready to go sailing). These authors argue that the main difference between phatic and non-phatic communicative acts concerns what the most relevant communicated information is about and

how this information is communicated. In phatic communication, the most relevant information is about the positive rapport between the interlocutors, whereas in non-phatic communicative interaction, the main relevance lies with information which builds to a greater extent on the meanings of the words used. On this approach, the knowledge of conventions about conducting phatic exchanges merely facilitates (but does not explain the possibility of) phatic communication. This raises the question of how phatic exchanges are routinely conducted successfully even when they cannot be explained in terms of conventions or norms.

One way to think about the comprehension of phatic utterances goes as follows: the evidence presented by the linguistic meaning of the communicative act suggests that it is not particularly relevant in virtue of the its linguistic meaning and the hearer considers how the act could have been intended to be relevant. The hearer concludes that the act was relevant mainly in virtue of the evidence presented by the act itself. By producing an ostensive stimulus the speaker manifestly performs a social action. Hence the phatic utterance is understood as intended socially. Of course, the specific social implicatures communicated by the utterance are also informed by the meanings of the words used (say, because these are consistent with the speaker's positive interest and her/his social disposition towards the hearer).

Another way to think about the comprehension of a phatic utterance would be that the act of communication recognised as phatic activates what might be termed a "phatic schema", activated when a phatic topic has been detected. Žegarac and Clark (1999) identify two universal properties of good conventional phatic topics. A topic is suitable for use in phatic communication if: (a) the interlocutors can reliably presume (even if they are complete strangers) that the topic is potentially relevant to them in readily conceivable circumstances, and (b) the topic is not very relevant in the immediate situation of communication (or the conversational exchange will be commensurably less phatic or not phatic at all). It is important to note that for the topic to be recognized as phatic, it need not be conventionally phatic. Thus, the utterance in (3) above, "No sight of a bus. I suppose they'll all come together", satisfies both features of phatic topics. The "phatic schema" activated by the initial categorization of a communicative act as phatic can be thought of as a higher order knowledge structure about this type of language use. The comprehension procedure incorporated in this schema most likely includes some biases relating to the allocation of effort and expectations about the type and range of cognitive effects, and streamlines comprehension. It is a fast and frugal heuristic, which can be described as a sub-procedure of the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure. Moreover, it would naturally allow for the possibility of having phatic exchanges about topics which are not conventionally (or standardly) used in this type of communication. What is needed is that the perception of the situation by the hearer should activate the heuristic. It would also allow for the possibility that the conversation may start as a comparatively highly phatic exchange and then move on to a different type with the gradual or abrupt shift away from the biases of the "phatic heuristic".

The problem with explaining phatic communication in terms of conventionalisation or standardisation is that it makes wrong predictions about which conversational exchanges have the typical features associated with the phatic use of language (e.g. the exchange in (3) would be ruled out by stipulation). But the view that non-conventionally phatic utterances are also readily recognised is also somewhat problematic. It seems reasonable to assume that the general situation, given the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure, would lead to the intended phatic interpretation although it would require comparatively more time (and processing effort). The availability of a "phatic schema", an abstract knowledge structure with in-built biases relating to the balance of effort and effect (the types of effects included), seems highly adaptive in that it makes possible an instant activation by a topic recognised as phatic and the search for particular types of effects (i.e. those relating to the positive rapport between the participants). Conceptualising phatic comprehension in this way would, in fact, lead us to posit various heuristics and sub-heuristics. For example, there may be a "casual conversation" heuristic, which differs from the phatic heuristic in that it does not preclude highly relevant topics, but shares with it a bias towards low effort and high processing speed.

It is an empirical question how exactly the heuristics are to be described. However, if a proposal along these lines is anything to go by, the analogy between UG and the universal mechanism of human communication is more interesting than it may initially seem to be. Just as UG is a device for learning or acquiring a grammar, the universal cognitive mechanism which underlies the comprehension of communicative acts, what I have termed U-Pragmatics, can be seen as a device for learning the fast and frugal heuristics adapted to the comprehension of particular socio-culturally defined types of communicative interaction. In this view, the general Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure is simply an abstraction from the various more or less culture-specific procedures, rather than the procedure that the participants in communication actually follow. From this perspective, the pragmatic competence of an individual would include the set of (sub-)procedures that they have internalised. Therefore, it might make sense to extend the analogy between linguistic and pragmatic knowledge by positing a level of I-Pragmatics, by analogy with the concept of I-Language (Internalized Language).

4. E-PRAGMATICS AND I-PRAGMATICS

Chomsky (1986) introduces the distinction between I-Language (Internalized language) and E-Language (Externalized language). He traces the idea behind the notion of I-Language back to Otto Jespersen who 'held that there is some "notion of structure" in the mind of the speaker "which is definite enough to guide him in framing sentences of his own," in particular, "free expressions" that may be new to the speaker and to others.' (cited in Chomsky 1986: 23) The term I-Language refers to "some element of the mind of the person who knows the language, acquired by the learner and used by

the speaker-hearer" (Chomsky 1986: 23). On this view, UG or LAD is "the theory of human I-languages, a system of conditions deriving from the human biological endowment that identifies the I-languages that are humanly accessible under normal conditions" (Chomsky 1986: 23). UG and I-Language are proper objects of scientific investigation, and stand in sharp contrast to individual languages, such as English, Japanese, French, Hungarian, Greek and others, which are epiphenomenal. In other words, they are products of various historical and political influences. Chomsky introduced the term E-language as a label for the construct of a language "understood independently of the properties of the mind/brain" (Chomsky 1986). The term E-Language encompasses various models of language, such as: language as a historical construct, language as behaviour and the products of behaviour (see Sampson 1980).

4.1. E-Pragmatics

Social pragmatics aims at describing actual communicative interactions and seeks to gain insights about communication in general, as well as communication in particular socio-cultural settings through inductive generalisations based on primary data. By analogy with the term E-Language, I am tempted to call the social approaches to communication E-Pragmatics. A useful overview of various approaches to discourse, including the social perspectives on communication which seem plausible candidates for E-Pragmatics, is provided in Schiffrin (1994). Just as the view that E-Language is not a proper object of scientific investigation should not be taken as a justification for dismissing the value of the enormous body work on individual languages (e.g. to provide evidence for hypotheses about UG and I-Language) E-Pragmatics research should not be dismissed on the grounds that its research instruments need to be theoretically motivated and its findings explained in the context of U-Pragmatics. Moreover, the interaction of U-Pragmatics and E-Pragmatics should not be one way traffic: E-Pragmatics provides evidence for evaluating U-Pragmatics and U-Pragmatics should guide research in E-Pragmatics.

4.1.1.   E-Pragmatics provides evidence for evaluating U-Pragmatics

Working on the description of communicative events within the framework of Conversation Analysis, Firth (1996) identifies a number of phenomena commonly observed in conversational interaction: (a) "Flagging" (speakers put out 'flags' (e.g. hesitation markers, word cut-offs, self-repairs) when they anticipate potential difficulties in the comprehension of communicative acts), (b) "Make it Normal" (in naturally occurring interactions, participants are typically more oriented towards comprehension than to linguistic form, and do not usually react explicitly to atypical linguistic behaviour), and (c) "Let it Pass" (when the hearer is unable to interpret or understand an utterance, s/he does not usually seek to clarify it immediately, but "lets pass"). Firth's

(1996) work exemplifies the perspective on communicative interaction typical of E-Pragmatics. The goal is to identify certain observable regularities without reference to the (theoretical models of) the underlying cognitive-psychological mechanisms. A plausible U-Pragmatics should be able to provide theoretically motivated accounts of these phenomena. It seems that the Communicative Principle of Relevance and the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure (along with other RT assumptions about communication) do provide such explanations.

"Flagging"

If the speaker aims to convey the message while putting the hearer to minimal expenditure of processing effort, it is to be expected that s/he will use "flags". These alert the hearer that if the interpretation of the utterance is found to require greater processing effort than seems reasonable, clarification should be sought, rather than investing more effort in trying to interpret the utterance. "Flags" may also provide evidence of (and implicate) that the speaker is doing her/his best to communicate as efficiently as possible and is aware that s/he may fail. Therefore, "flags" can be explained as devices that contribute to communicative efficiency.

"Make it good"

If the communicative act is less than perfect but (a) this does not make comprehension very difficult or impossible and (b) the oddity of the communicative act is not evidently deliberate, then a hearer who follows the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure should opt for the first interpretation s/he finds consistent with the Communicative Principle of Relevance. There is simply no reason for the hearer to pay undue attention to the oddity of the communicative act after the act has been interpreted successfully.

"Let-it-pass"

The Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure (i.e. U-Pragmatics) predicts that the hearer's decision to "let pass" should be observed in two types of situation. First, when the part of the message that has not been conveyed successfully is not deemed very relevant and the part of the message that has been grasped seems sufficiently relevant to the hearer to meet his/her expectations of relevance. Second, in case that following the Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure would lead the hearer not to 'let pass' and that it seems reasonable to assume that the hearer has a preference for making a 'let pass' decision, extra communicative factors (such as protecting one's own or the interlocutor's face) should be considered as they may have motivated the hearer's preference for 'let pass'.

4.1.2.   *U-Pragmatics guides research in E-Pragmatics*

Much descriptive work in social pragmatics has been carried out on institutionalized speech acts in different cultures. The research has often involved establishing a taxonomy of response type strategies for performing

speech acts and responding to them, and then describing cultural similarities and differences in terms of the particular "strategies" that have been observed as more or less normative constraints on the performance of those acts. For example, Pomerantz (1978) points outs that, when responding to compliments, complimentees face a dilemma. On the one hand, they are likely to feel under some degree of pressure to accept the compliment. On the other hand, they feel that they should avoid accepting praise. Compliment response strategies arise as solutions to these situational pressures.

Responses to compliments can be classified into: acceptances (agreements), rejections (disagreements) and self-praise avoidance mechanisms (upgrades and downgrades, referent shifts: return, reassignment). These strategies have been categorised into several groups according to the frequency of their usage. The most common compliment response strategies are: thanking (accepting, expressing gratitude), agreeing (attending to the complimenter's positive face), expressing gratitude, joking (a positive politeness strategy, because it appeals to the solidarity and in group membership of the interlocutors, although it seems to challenge the compliment), thanking and returning the compliment, encouraging the complimenter to do or get something as well, offering the object complimented on to the complimenter, explaining, doubting and rejecting.

However observationally accurate these descriptive classifications may be, they miss an important aspect of responding to a compliment. Consider (4):

(4)   <u>Situation:</u> Jane has just met Julia who has lost a lot of weight since they last met.

   Jane: Wow! You look amazing!
   Julia: Well, I just hope it lasts.

Has Julia accepted the compliment? In a way, she has, but, intuitively, the main point (technically, the main relevance) of Julia's response to Jane's compliment lies with a degree of positive appreciation that she has conveyed, rather than with her acceptance of the compliment. In relevance-theoretic terms, it is the speaker's responsibility to ensure that the utterance is optimally relevant to the hearer. Therefore, in responding to a compliment, the complimentee should bear in mind the complimenter's expectations. The desirable response to a compliment is one which shows the appropriate degree of the complimentee's appreciation of the compliment. This suggests that appreciation should be the basis of the classification of responses to compliments, cross-cutting all other categories, such as acceptance and rejection. A compliment can be accepted in ways which show varying degrees of appreciation, and these are more significant than the fact that the compliment has been accepted. In fact, a compliment may also be rejected in a way which shows appreciation (e.g. "I am really glad you like it, although I have my doubts."). So, it is the different ways of showing or not showing appreciation, rather than overt acceptance or rejection, that should be the focus of description and analysis of this speech act. The categories of acceptance and rejection derived by inductive generalisations based on primary data, are of limited use for explaining the dynamics of complimenting behaviour, and

may be misleading if assumed to reflect norms which guide communicative behaviour (see Bhatti 2014).

4.2. I-Pragmatics

By analogy with the concept of I-Language the 'pragmatic competence' of an individual could be described, at least in part, as including a range of comprehension (sub-) procedures. As the universal mechanism of human communication, the Communicative Principle of Relevance can be described as a mechanism for learning comprehension sub-heuristics shaped by particular types of regularities in the environment. If this is roughly true, it seems reasonable to posit a level of "I-Pragmatics". An interesting consequence of this move is that it makes it possible to conceptualise more explicitly the interface between the socio-cultural and the cognitive psychological perspectives on communication. The two approaches try to do different things, but there are some important points of contact between them. As I have tried to show in section 4.1., insights into the universal cognitive psychological mechanisms of communication have a contribution to make to social-descriptive pragmatics. In section 3. a case was made for the view that the universal cognitive mechanisms of communication, what I have termed U-Pragmatics, explain the emergence and learning of culture-specific comprehension (sub-) procedures that an individual uses in dealing with regularities presented by various types of language use and types of communication situations. The abstract knowledge structures which incorporate these (sub-)procedures of the Relevance-Theoretic Comprehension Procedure seem analogous in interesting ways to the concept of I-Language, so the investigation of this culture-specific aspect of pragmatic competence from the cognitive-psychological perspective could be called "I-Pragmatics".

I-Pragmatics has significant implications for conceptualising the relation between social and cognitive approaches to communication. We can accept Blakemore's (1992) observation (see quote in section 1) that social pragmatics and cognitive pragmatics attempt to do different things. The development of pragmatic competence (I-Pragmatics) could be described as establishing the links between regularities in the environment (types of language use, types of social situations) and appropriate heuristics (warranted by the Communicative Principle of Relevance). The view that pragmatic competence at the level of individual psychology is shaped by the interaction of U-Pragmatics, various other modular mechanisms of the mind (including the social ability) as well as environmental regularities which are largely culture-specific, suggests that at the level of individual psychology pragmatic competence is a natural meeting point of U-Pragmatics and E-Pragmatics research.

5. CONCLUSION

Relevance-theoretic pragmatics studies the cognitive mechanisms and processes involved in ostensive inferential communication. According to this

approach to communication, the pragmatic competence of an individual can be described in at least two ways.

One view is that pragmatic competence involves, at least, the general Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure (as well as a production procedure which has not been considered in this paper, but see Žegarac (2004)) and the knowledge of norms of communication, which may be stored in various schemas and scripts and activated in chunks, thus giving rise to specific expectations of relevance. On this view, cross-cultural differences at the level of pragmatic competence are described as differences in the contexts available to members of particular socio-cultural groups.

Another possibility is that pragmatic competence includes a set of comprehension (sub-)heuristics which an individual learns or acquires. This does not preclude the existence of culture specific norms of communication which are part of an individual's memory storage. However, the observable features of spontaneous comprehension suggest that this process tends to be guided by (sub-)heuristics, rather than by socio-cultural norms.

Of course, which of the models of pragmatic competence is adequate in descriptive and explanatory terms needs to be established on empirical grounds. However, the difficulty in bringing to consciousness the knowledge that guides comprehension, the difficulties in stating the contents of culture-specific norms in a way which explains comprehension, as well as insights into the function and the emergence of fast and frugal heuristics, suggest that the conceptualisation of pragmatic competence as involving a set of culture-particular comprehension procedures merits further research.

REFERENCES

Allott 2002: N. Allott, Relevance and rationality, UCL Working Papers in Linguistics, 14, 69–82.

Bach, Harnish 1982: K. Bach, R. M. Harnish, *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bhatti 2014: J. Bhatti, The Communication of Emotions in England and Poland: Compliments and Refusals, University of Bedfordshire PhD thesis.

Blakemore 1992: D. Blakemore, *Understanding Utterances: An introduction to Pragmatics*, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Brown 1995: G. Brown, *Speakers, Listeners, and Communication: Explorations in Discourse Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carston 2002: R. Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Chase, Simon 1973: W. G. Chase, H. A. Simon, The mind's eye in chess, in: W. G. Chase (ed), *Visual Information Processing*, New York: Academic Press, 215–281.

Chomsky 1986: N. Chomsky, *Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use*, New York: Praeger.

Chomsky 1965: N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Escandell-Vidal 2004: V. Escandell-Vidal, Norms and Principles: Putting Social and Cognitive Pragmatics Together, in: R. Márquez-Reiter, M. E. Placencia (eds), Current Trends in the Pragmatics of Spanish, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 347–371.

Firth 1996: A. Firth, The discursive accomplishment of normality: On "lingua franca" English and conversation analysis, *Journal of Pragmatics*, 26, 237–259.

Fodor 1983: J. A. Fodor, *The Modularity of Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gigerenzer *et al* 2002: G. Gigerenzer, J. Czerlinsky, L. Martignon, How good are fast and frugal heuristics?, in: R. Elio (ed), *Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 148–173.

Goffman 1967: E. Goffman, *Interaction Ritual*, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.

Jakobson 1960: R. Jakobson, Concluding statement: linguistics and poetics, in: T. A. Sebeok (ed), *Style in Language*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lyons 1968: J. Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pomerantz 1978: A. Pomerantz, Compliment Responses: Notes on the Cooperation of Multiple Constraints, in: J. Schenkein (ed), *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction*,

New York, Academic Press, 79–112.

Sampson 1980: G. Sampson, *Schools of Linguistics: Competition and Evolution*, London: Hutchinson.

Schaden 2010: G. Schaden, Vocatives: A note on addressee-management, *University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics*, 16, 176–185.

Schank 1980: R. C. Schank, How much intelligence is there in artificial intelligence?, *Intelligence*, 4, 1–14.

Schiffrin 1994: D. Schiffrin, *Approaches to Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Searle 1996: J. R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, London: Penguin Books.

Sperber (ed) 2000: D. Sperber, *Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sperber, Wilson 2002: D. Sperber, D. Wilson, Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading, *Mind and Language*, 17 (1), 3–33.

Sperber, Wilson 1986/95: D. Sperber, D. Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Sternberg 1990: R. J. Sternberg, *Metaphors of Mind: Conceptions of the Nature of Intelligence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson 2000: D. Wilson, Metarepresentation in linguistic communication, in: D. Sperber (ed), *Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 411–448.

Žegarac 2004: V. Žegarac, Relevance theory and *the* in second language acquisition, Second Language Research, 20 (3), 193–211.

Žegarac, Clark 1999: V. Žegarac, B. Clark, Phatic interpretations and phatic communication, *Journal of Linguistics*, 35, 321–46.

Vladimir M. Žegarac

U-PRAGMATIKA I E-PRAGMATIKA: ARGUMENTI ZA I-PRAGMATIKU

Rezime

U ovom članku učinjen je pokušaj da se obrazloži jedna nova koncepcija odnosa između socijalnog (deskriptivnog) i kognitivnog (psihološkog) pristupa izučavanju komunikacije razvijenog u okviru teorije relevancije. Izloženi argumenti se zasnivaju na analogiji između pojmova *Univerzalne gramatike*, *E-jezika* i *I-jezika*, razvijenih u okviru generativne lingvistike, i modela kognitivnih mehanizama i psiholoških procesa komunikacije, razvijenih u okviru teorije relevancije. Argumenti navode na zaključak da pragmatička kompetencija, koja se na nivou individualne psihologije može nazvati „I-pragmatika" (po analogiji sa pojmom „I-jezik"), predstavlja prirodnu dodirnu tačku univerzalnih kognitivnih mehanizama komunikacije i mehanizama specifičnih za komunikacijske sisteme pojedinih kultura.

Ključne reči: socijalni, kognitivni, pragmatika, relevancija, univerzalna gramatika, E-jezik, I-jezik, kompetencija